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I. INTRODUCTION
The patent statute directs that “[u]pon finding for the claimant
the court shall award the claimant damages adequate to
compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the
* Professor of Economics, University of Utah, and Trial Lawyer, IP
Litigation Section, Parsons Behle & Latimer, respectively. The views expressed
herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their
respective organizations or clients. The authors would like to thank Jeff
Marowits and Samantha Price of Keystone Strategy for their valuable
comments and input into this paper.
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infringer . . . .” 1 The statute, therefore, defines two general
categories of damages recoverable for patent infringement—lost
profits or a reasonable royalty. The requirements for legal causation
(as well as the express language of the statute) compel that both
forms of damages are properly tied and limited to the infringing
activity.
Upon proper proof, lost profits are recoverable, but those
profits are only to “compensate for the infringement.” 2 The task of
the trier of fact, and the lawyers and experts who inform the trier
of fact, is to reconstruct the “but for world.” What would the patent
owner’s financial condition have been had the infringer not
infringed? The patent owner is only to be compensated for the
infringement, not for factors extraneous to use of the patented
invention.
Reasonable royalty damages are similarly properly limited to
compensate “for the use made of the invention by the infringer.” 3
Both the royalty base and the royalty rate must be circumscribed by
the value added by the patented invention. Values attributable to
non-claimed features of a product or method of manufacture, or to
any other extraneous factor (e.g., business acumen, advertising,
reputation) are properly excluded from the calculus. And it is the
duty of the judge to make sure that reasonable royalty damages
models presented to triers of fact are properly so circumscribed.
While both forms of damages are properly limited to the value
added by the patented invention, they do differ in terms of their
focal point. Lost profits damages look to the benefit lost by the
patent owner. Accordingly, it is the patent owner’s “but for” price,
sales volume, manufacturing and marketing capacity, and profit
margin—not those of the infringer—that are most relevant. 4 In
contrast, reasonable royalty damages focus on the value of “the use
made of the invention by the infringer” 5—or perhaps, more
accurately, the anticipated value of the use to be made of the
invention at the time the infringement began, for it is that
anticipated value that drives half of the willing licensor/willing
licensee analysis. Accordingly, the evidentiary and expert inquiry is
properly focused on the infringer’s anticipated price, sales volume,
cost structure, and profit margin. Microeconomic principles inform
both of these inquiries and triers of fact confronted with either (or
both) type of damages will benefit from cogent analysis from
economic professionals.

35 U.S.C. § 284 (West 2012) (emphasis added).
Id.
3 Id.
4 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th
Cir. 1978).
5 35 U.S.C. § 284.
1
2
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But, how does one go about determining what is “adequate to
compensate for the infringement” or a “reasonable royalty for the
use made of the invention by the infringer”? In recent years, the
Federal Circuit has significantly reshaped the law of lost profits in
a direction aligned with microeconomic principles. 6 More recently,
the Federal Circuit appears to have initiated a similar overhaul of
the rules for calculating a reasonable royalty. 7 That process is at an
earlier stage of development, however, and, at least in our view,
could benefit from a more fulsome understanding of the underlying
microeconomic principles and a more careful application of their
teachings. We offer this modest contribution to that quest. In
particular, our thesis is that the so-called “analytical method”
approach to a reasonable royalty, as applied by some damages
experts and some courts, cannot be reconciled with basic economic
principles. We argue that, once the economic flaws in that method
are corrected, the analytical method is not, as some have professed,
an entirely separate methodology from the willing licensor/willing
licensee paradigm, 8 but rather resolves down to basically one of the
steps in the willing licensor/willing licensee analysis—a step in
which the upper boundary of the reasonable royalty range is
identified. As a consequence, the analytical method in our view
makes no independent contribution to the law of patent damages
separate from the willing licensor/willing licensee framework.
In pursuit of this thesis, we first discuss the emergence of the
so-called analytical method and identify its various iterations. We
next identify the economic deficiencies of the analytical method as
applied in the case law, and contrast that with the more
economically robust Federal Circuit law developed in lost profits
cases. Finally, we discuss the properly limited use of the analytical
method and its contribution towards arriving at an appropriate
reasonable royalty. Although Federal Circuit law on calculating a
reasonable royalty is in flux, we contend that its general direction
is consistent with our argument and hope that our modest
contribution will advance the law’s development in this area.

See discussion at section III, infra.
See discussion at section IV, infra.
8 John Skenyon, Christopher Marchese & John Land, Patent Damages Law
& Practice § 3:8 (West 2015) (describing the “analytical approach” as “really
ha[ving] little to do with any hypothetical licensing negotiation”); DANIEL
JACKSON, AICPA, Calculating Intellectual Property Infringement Damages,
BUSINESS VALUATION & FORENSIC & LITIGATION SERVICES SECTION PRACTICE
AID 06-1, at 59-60 (Daniel L. Jackson ed. 2006).
6
7
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II. THE ANALYTICAL METHOD
A. Pre-Federal Circuit Roots
The first appearance of what would later be called the
“analytical method” was in the Second Circuit’s opinion in GeorgiaPacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, 9 the same case
that, at the district court level, spawned the now famous 15
factors. 10 In that appeal, Georgia Pacific (“GP”) challenged the
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971).
10 The fifteen factors are:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the
patent in suit, proving or tending to prove an established
royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents
comparable to the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or nonexclusive; or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory
or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor's established policy and marketing program to
maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the
invention or by granting licenses under special conditions
designed to preserve that monopoly.
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and
licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same
territory in the same line of business; or whether they are
inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales
of other products of the licensee; that existing value of the
invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his nonpatented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed
sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the
patent; its commercial success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the
old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out
similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the
commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the
licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the
invention; and any evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be
customary in the particular business or in comparable
businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous
inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited
to the invention as distinguished from non-patented elements,
the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant
features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
9
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reasonableness of the district court’s awarded royalty resulting
from application of the “willing buyer-willing seller” analysis and
the fifteen Georgia Pacific factors. 11 The district court awarded a
royalty of $50 per thousand square feet on GP’s infringing striated
plywood. 12 According to GP, that royalty left it with virtually no
profits on the sale of the product. 13 The record evidence showed that
a thousand square feet of striated plywood sold for $159.41. 14 After
costs were subtracted, the expected profit was $50.00, thus leaving
no profit after application of a $50.00 royalty. 15 GP contended that
such a royalty was per se unreasonable because no rational licensee
would agree to a royalty that left it with no profit in the voluntary
negotiation posited by the willing buyer-willing seller framework. 16
The Second Circuit agreed, finding that “the royalty imposed . . .
gobbles up all of GP’s expected profit” 17 and “fails to leave GP a
reasonable profit on its sale of striated plywood.” 18
To remedy this deficiency, the Second Circuit looked to GP’s
financials, which revealed that GP’s average profit margin 19 for all
its products was approximately 9%. The court reasoned that, in the
hypothetical willing licensor/willing licensee negotiation, “GP would
have been willing to pay a royalty which, after payment of its other
costs, would leave it nine per cent profit on sales of the licensed

15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a
licensee (such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the
time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and
voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount
which a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business
proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a
particular article embodying the patented invention—would
have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a
reasonable profit and which amount would have been
acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a
license.
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
As we develop below, it is appropriate that the analytical method would
trace its roots back to Georgia Pacific, as in our view the method is best viewed
as a support to, not a separate test from, the willing licensor/willing licensee
paradigm.
11 Georgia-Pacific, 446 F.2d at 296.
12 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1143.
13 Georgia-Pacific, 446 F.2d at 299.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Interestingly, the original application of the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors
led to an insupportable and unrealistic result.
17 Georgia-Pacific, 446 F.2d at 299.
18 Id. at 297.
19 Id. at 299-300. Profit margin is defined as the gross or net profits on a
firm’s income statement divided by its sales for some period of time.

6
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item” 20—the average margin it earned on its other products. 21 The
court accordingly reduced the awarded per unit royalty by 9% or
$14.35, leaving a unit royalty of $35.65 or 22%. 22 Thus, the court
effectively assumed that GP’s average profit margin on all of its
products was a suitable proxy for a “normal” profit margin on nonpatented striated plywood, and that any margin above that average
was appropriately attributed to the patented invention.
Accordingly, even in its first application, what would later be
termed the “analytical method” was used in the context of the
willing licensor/willing licensee framework. How that analysis
would later morph into a purportedly independent, alternative
method of calculating a reasonable royalty remains a mystery.
It took six years for the analytical method, albeit still
unnamed, to reemerge in a published opinion—the Court of Claims’
decision in Tektronix, Inc. v. United States. 23 The plaintiff in that
case, Tektronix, manufactured oscilloscopes, instruments used to
observe changes in an electrical signal over time. The U.S.
Government (itself a named defendant) procured 17,542 infringing
scopes over a ten-year period from the other defendants. That the
competing scopes infringed was not subject to reasonable dispute. 24
Indeed, the court found that the government, “unable to obtain
comparable, noninfringing scopes from alternative sources, tailored
its procurement specifications in such a way as to make
infringement of plaintiff’s patents a virtual prerequisite for
obtaining the Government contracts.” 25
Tektronix maintained that “reasonable compensation” to it
under 28 U.S.C. § 1498 would be lost profits on the scopes it could
have produced and sold, and a reasonable royalty on the remaining
sales. 26 The court rejected Tektronix’s request for lost profits and
instead held that it was entitled only to a reasonable royalty on all
of the infringing sales. 27 To calculate the resulting damages, the
court adopted the method used by the Second Circuit in GeorgiaPacific, characterizing it as the “willing-buyer/willing-seller
concept”:
In Georgia-Pacific, the court reasoned that had the infringer taken a
license rather than infringe, the infringer would have been willing to
Georgia-Pacific, 446 F.2d at 300.
The court did not, at least expressly, analyze the other half of the
hypothetical negotiation—whether 9 percent would have been acceptable to the
licensor.
22 Georgia-Pacific, 446 F.2d at 300 n.3.
23 Tektronix, Inc. v. United States, 552 F.2d 343 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
24 Id. at 345.
25 Id. In fact, one competing bidder was so bold as to respond to the invitation
to bid by offering a “Tektronix, Inc. Model 535 as manufactured by Hickok.” Id.
26 Id. at 346.
27 Id. at 348-49. The court found that Tektronix failed to show it would have
procured those contracts but for the infringement. Id. at 349.
20
21
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pay as a royalty the sale price of the patented article as sold by the
infringer, minus the cost of manufacturer [sic] of the article and
minus the infringer’s usual profit. In that case, the infringer’s usual
profit was 9% so that 9% of the selling price was deducted from the
profit pool generated by the sale of the patented article and awarded
to the infringer, while the remainder of the profit constituted the
royalty to be remitted to the patentee. On the facts in that case, the
royalty, expressed as a percentage, was 22.36% of the infringer’s sale
price. 28

Applying that approach, the Court of Claims calculated the
damages to be awarded to Tektronix as follows: “Start with the
infringer’s selling price, deduct its costs in order to find its gross
profit, then allocate to the infringer its normal profit, 29 and end up
with the residual share of the gross profit which can be assigned to
the patentee as its royalty.” 30 This resulted in a calculated royalty
rate of 7.65%. The court then increased the rate to 10% because,
according to the court, “[t]his represents our best judgment, on the
material we have before us, of what reasonable ‘parties might well
have agreed upon.’” 31
In our view, the Tektronix court’s articulation and application
of the test has important implications for proper application of the
analytical method today. First, the court described the process as a
“negotiation formula,” 32 reinforcing its legal moorings to the
hypothetical willing licensor/willing licensee approach, not
professing to provide any basis for a separate approach. Indeed, in
increasing the royalty to 10% from the calculated rate of 7.65%, the
court expressly applied the willing-buyer/willing-seller construct,
which it, quoting Judge Learned Hand, described as a “device in aid
of justice” 33:
We do not, however, stop with the 7.65% of unit price which our own
calculation produces for plaintiff’s residual share. We think that a
reasonable patentee in the position of plaintiff, which was realizing a
profit in excess of 25% on its own non-Government sales of
oscilloscopes, would have insisted on a somewhat higher royalty than
7.65%, and that a reasonable potential licensee would have agreed,
in order to be able to sell the item without legal question—even if at
a somewhat higher price than if no royalty were to be paid. Such a
potential licensee, if reasonable, would recognize that plaintiff, which
took the risks and bore the expense of developing the scopes and
creating a market for them, was entitled to substantial compensation
Id. at 349.
The infringer’s “normal profit” was based on an eight-year average profit
margin of 2.7%. Id. at 350, n.10.
30 Id. at 349.
31 Id. at 351.
32 Id. at 349.
33 Id. (citing Cincinnati Car. Co. v. N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 66 F.2d 592,
595 (2d. Cir. 1933)).
28
29
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for those efforts and for its ingenuity in creating this important and
effective instrument. 34

Second, the court recognized that fair compensation was
appropriately limited to the value added by the patented invention:
[W]e do not believe that such a reasonable potential licensee would
be willing, or could be expected to be willing, to pay as a royalty the
25% or so plaintiff was making in profit on its own non-Governmental
sales of scopes. A portion of that 25% profit represented
compensation, not for the patented idea itself, but for the efficiencies
and risks of manufacture as well as the investment of other capital.
Certainly that portion of the plaintiff’s profit is separate and apart
from any compensation due it for use of its patents. In any event, a
royalty of 25% is very high and unlikely to be paid by a willing
licensee which is content to make a very low profit for itself. 35

Thus, the pre-Federal Circuit cases from which subsequent
decisions purport to draw support for the “analytical method”
provide no sure footing for its now-claimed status as a purportedly
wholly separate method for arriving at “a reasonable royalty for the
use made of the invention by the infringer” as required by the patent
statute. Rather, those cases properly limit the analytical method to
help define the bounds, or at least a starting point, for application
of the traditional willing licensor/willing licensee construct.

B. Post-Federal Circuit Creation Applications of the
Analytical Method
As far as we can ascertain, the title “analytical approach” or
“analytical method” traces its origin to the Federal Circuit’s 1986
decision in TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp. 36 In that case, the
Federal Circuit reviewed a special master’s report (adopted in full
by the district court) over challenges by the infringer that the
resulting damages were “grossly excessive.” 37 The Federal Circuit
referred to the special master’s damage method as the “analytical
approach”:
The special master, citing Georgia-Pacific and Tektronix, used the socalled “analytical approach,” in which she subtracted the infringer’s
usual or acceptable net profit from its anticipated net profit realized
from sales on infringing devices. 38
34 Tektronix, 552 F.2d at 350. Of course, by raising the reasonable royalty
2.35% to 10%, the court essentially took all of the infringer’s “normal profit,”
leaving it a scant .35% margin.
35 Id. at 350-51.
36 TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
37 Id. at 898.
38 Id. at 899. The Special Master’s report appears to have coined the phrase.
See Report of Special Master Pursuant to F.R.C.P. 53 at 3, TWM Mfg. Co. v.
Dura Corp., Inc., No. 74-72852, 1985 WL 72665 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 1984) (“For
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As explained by the special master, “[t]his analytical approach
takes the anticipated net profit realized by the infringer from sales
of the infringing device and subtracts the usual or acceptable net
profit of the infringer.” 39
The special master’s calculation began with the selling price of
the infringing device:
Relying principally on a memorandum written by [the infringer’s] ‘top
management’ before the initial infringement, the special master
found that [the infringer] projected a gross profit averaging 52.7%
from its infringing sales. From that figure, she subtracted overhead
expenses to get an anticipated net profit in the range of 37% to 42%.
Subtracting the industry standard net profit of 6.56% to 12.5% from
that anticipated net profit range, she arrived at a 30% reasonable
royalty. 40

The Federal Circuit upheld the 30% royalty under the
applicable abuse of discretion standard, concluding that the
infringer had “not persuaded this court that a 30% royalty does not
reflect what a willing licensor and licensee would have agreed to in
1967, based on the present record.” 41
Far from endorsing a new and separate approach for
calculating reasonable royalty damages as some have argued, 42
both the TWM Mfg. court 43 and the parties 44 acknowledged that the
willing licensor/willing licensee construct was the governing test
and that the analytical approach was being applied in support of,
not as a substitute to, that test. Moreover, the court’s affirmance of
a 30% royalty rate is likely more attributable to the infringer’s
failure to engage on the specifics of the special master’s analysis
(e.g., using an industry standard net profit as the proxy measure for
“normal profit”) and the underlying record in light of the governing
abuse of discretion standard, 45 as it is to a full-throated
the reasons stated below this Magistrate agrees that the analytical approach
cited in Georgia-Pacific, supra, and Tektronix, supra, is appropriate to the case
at bar.”).
39 Report of Special Master, supra note 38, at 3.
40 TWM Mfg., 789 F.2d at 899.
41 Id. at 900.
42 Patent Damages Law & Practice at § 3:8.
43 TWM Mfg., 789 F.2d at 900.
44 Id. at 898.
45 See id. at 899 (“On appeal, an infringer cannot successfully argue that the
district court abused its discretion in awarding a ‘high’ royalty by simply
substituting its own recomputation to arrive at a lower figure.” “Dura’s pointing
to facts that might have supported a lower royalty does not sustain its burden
of showing that the district court abused its discretion in adopting the facts
found by the special master. Nor does it establish that the special master’s
findings were clearly erroneous.”), 900 (“The special master properly rejected
Dura’s effort to downplay the significance of its pre-infringement internal
memorandum, because it was more probative than profits realized shortly after
the infringement, because Dura’s loss of its documents precluded TWM from
showing lost profits, and because Dura used the figures in the memorandum in

10
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endorsement of the analytical approach, let alone any suggestion
that such approach may stand independent of the willing
licensor/willing licensee construct.
In 1990, Judge Mazzone of the District of Massachusetts was
tasked with calculating an appropriate award of damages arising
out of a 14-year patent infringement dispute between Polaroid and
Kodak involving Kodak’s infringement of multiple Polaroid instant
photography patents. 46 At the conclusion of a ninety-six day bench
trial, the court awarded a hybrid lost profits/reasonable royalty
award that, with a pre- and post-judgment interest award
essentially equivalent to the calculated royalty damages, totaled
over $900 million 47—which, incidentally, was only a fraction of what
Polaroid sought. 48
The court’s analysis of the reasonable royalty portion of the
damages is of most interest to our discussion. First, the court
identified “two generally accepted approaches to the determination
of a reasonable royalty” 49: (1) the “analytical approach” of TWM
Mfg., which the court described as “requir[ing] an analysis of
evidence bearing on Kodak’s entry into the market, including its
own internal profit projections”; 50 and (2) “the construction of a
hypothetical negotiation between a willing licensor and willing
licensee,” with the court citing Georgia-Pacific and Panduit as
examples of this second approach. 51 As far as we can ascertain, this
is the first instance of a court identifying the analytical approach of
TWM as a separate method for determining a reasonable royalty.
Although, interestingly, the Polaroid court arrived at the same
“reasonable” royalty rate using each approach, and expressed its
ultimate conclusion in terms of what the parties “would have agreed
upon”:
Considering all the factors applicable to either approach, and taking
into account all of the facts and circumstances, I conclude Polaroid
and Kodak would have negotiated in good faith and, taking into
account all of the information available to both sides, would have
agreed upon a royalty of ten percent, or slightly more than sixty
percent of Kodak’s anticipated profits through 1986 on those sales of
camera and film on which lost profits were not sufficient or could not
be proved. I also conclude that, independently of any negotiated
royalty rate, and after an analysis of Kodak’s February 1976
deciding whether to manufacture and market the infringing device.” “The
special master properly resolved the difficulty in determining the royalty figure
against Dura as an infringer which had lost its records.”).
46 Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., No. 76-1634-MA, 1990 WL 324105
(D. Mass. Oct. 12, 1990).
47 Id. at *84.
48 See id. at *31, *36 (Polaroid’s experts testified that expected profits
without the infringement were between $3.1 and $3.9 billion).
49 Id. at *72.
50 Id.
51 Id.
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projections, a royalty rate of ten percent is fair compensation. In my
judgment, under either approach a ten percent royalty will
“adequately compensate” Polaroid under section 284. 52

Fifteen years passed before the analytical method was again
discussed in a published opinion. In Fresenius Med. Care Holdings,
Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., 53 Judge Saundra Brown Armstrong of the
Northern District of California was confronted with a Daubert 54
challenge to the rebuttal expert damages report of Professor Daniel
L. Rubinfeld of the University of California, Berkeley. Fresenius
filed a declaratory judgment action that it did not infringe five
hemodialysis related patents owned by Baxter, and/or that those
patents were invalid. Baxter asserted infringement counterclaims
against Fresenius on all five patents. 55 The matter progressed
through discovery and the filing of expert reports.
Baxter challenged the admissibility of Dr. Rubinfeld’s expert
report on several grounds. Both sides agreed that that the proper
damages model was a reasonable royalty and that the willing
licensor/licensee approach was the proper methodology to arrive at
the reasonable royalty. 56 Baxter’s expert argued for a reasonable
royalty of $86 million, while Dr. Rubinfeld opined that the
reasonable royalty ranged from approximately $2 to $4 million. 57
While difficult to discern from the court’s opinion, it appears that
Dr. Rubinfeld arrived at this range by first estimating the
incremental profits attributable to the infringement by contrasting
Fresenius’ expected profits using the patented invention from what
its profits would have been had it used the next-best, non-infringing
alternative. 58 Dr. Rubinfeld then offered three possible
apportionments of these incremental profits, depending on whether
the trier of fact determined that the patented invention was
responsible for 100%, 50%, or 25% of the additional profits. 59
Fresenius defended Dr. Rubinfeld’s methodology claiming that
he used “an ‘analytical approach’ that has been expressly approved
by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(‘AICPA’),” 60 described by that organization as follows:
Polaroid, 1990 WL 324105, at *75 (emphasis in original).
Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Int’l, Inc., No. C03-1431SBA,
2006 WL 1390416 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 2006).
54 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
55 Fresenius, 2006 WL 1390416, at *1.
56 Id. at *4. According to the court, “A reasonable royalty is the amount that
‘a person, desiring to manufacture, use, or sell a patented article, as a business
proposition, would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make, use,
or sell the patented article, in the market, at a reasonable profit.’” Id. (quoting
Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552, 1568 (Fed.
Cir. 1984)).
57 Id. at *1.
58 Id. at *7.
59 Id.
60 Id.
52
53
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Another measurement methodology is the analytical method. The
royalty calculation under this method is based on the infringer’s own
internal profit projection for the infringing item at the time the
infringement began. The analytical method is based on the premise
that any rate of return in excess of a normal rate of return can be
attributed to the patent. This method takes the profits of the
infringer, subtracts the infringer’s normal profit, and awards some
portion of the remainder to the patent owner. 61

Baxter argued that Dr. Rubinfeld had not followed the AICPA’s
guidance by deducting Fresenius’ profits under the “next-best
alternative” rather than using a “normal rate of return” as outlined
by the AICPA and endorsed by the Federal Circuit in TWM Mfg. 62
The district court dismissed these concerns, stating that “TWM does
not convincingly show that Dr. Rubinfeld’s Rebuttal Expert Report
impermissibly deviates from the analytical method in a way
contrary to law” and characterizing Baxter’s argument as “mere
quibbling over whether Dr. Rubinfeld has used precise enough
terminology.” 63
Indeed, as we detail below, Dr. Rubinfeld’s use of incremental
profits over the next-best alternative more precisely measures the
value attributable to the patented invention, which after all is what
the patent statute dictates, than had he used Fresenius’ or some
industry average rate of return, as was deemed acceptable in
Georgia Pacific, Tektronix, and TWM. In any event, while
permitting (appropriately in our view) some flexibility in
application of the so-called analytical method, the method was still
employed in the context of the willing licensor/willing licensee
paradigm. Thus, Fresenius likewise provides no support for the
notion that the analytical method is a separate, alternative test.
The analytical approach was next mentioned just a year later,
in 2007, in the District of Delaware case Novozymes A/S v.
Genencor Int’l, Inc. 64 In that case, Genencor was held to have
infringed a Novozymes patent covering an alpha-amylase enzyme
principally used in the production of fuel ethanol. 65 Novozymes’s
damages expert, Julie L. Davis, argued for a royalty of 25% for
infringing enzyme sales within the fuel ethanol market and 8% for
sales in other markets. 66 Ms. Davis, a CPA and frequent damages
expert in high-profile patent cases, defended those rates as the
likely outcome of a hypothetical negotiation between Novozymes
and Genencor at the time the infringement began employing two
methodologies: (1) the “rule of thumb” that “the parties would
expect to split the expected profit margin of the infringing product,
Id.
Id. n.5.
63 Id.
64 Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592 (D. Del. 2007).
65 Id. at 610.
66 Id. at 606.
61
62
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with the patentee taking one quarter to one third of that margin as
a royalty”; 67 and (2) the “analytical method,” in which “the parties
would compare the expected profit margin of the infringing product
to the typical profit margin for the relevant business” and “[t]he
difference in those margins would be used to estimate an
appropriate royalty.” 68
Genencor’s expert, Dr. David J. Teece, an economist and
professor at the University of California, Berkeley’s Haas School of
Business, criticized the “rule of thumb” approach for having “no
analytical justification,” and Ms. Davis’s application of the
analytical method for relying on an industry typical profit margin,
rather than Genencor’s profit margin on its next-best non-infringing
alternative to calculate the incremental profits to be split between
the parties in the hypothetical license negotiation. 69 Correcting
Novozymes’s calculations for those and other errors, Dr. Teece
arrived at an across the board 8% reasonable royalty, as opposed to
Ms. Davis’s proposed 25% rate within the fuel ethanol market,
where the bulk of the infringing sales had occurred. 70
The court gave credence to both experts’ opinions, but
ultimately sided more with Ms. Davis, awarding a royalty of 20%
within the fuel ethanol market and 8% in other markets. 71
Importantly, the court’s discussion of the competing expert opinions
under both the analytical method and the more traditional GeorgiaPacific factors made frequent reference to what the parties to the
“hypothetical negotiation” would consider relevant and important,
reinforcing that the analytical method was being used as an aid to,
not a substitute for, the willing-licensor/willing-licensee approach. 72
The analytical method was next mentioned in the Federal
Circuit’s 2009 opinion in Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc. 73 There
the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial a jury
award of lump-sum reasonable royalty damages of $357,693,056.18
for an admittedly minor feature of Microsoft’s Outlook program—a
“date-picker” feature. 74 The court found the jury award unsupported
by substantial evidence. 75 Both sides’ experts had relied on the
willing-licensor/willing licensee approach to calculating reasonable
royalty damages. 76 Lucent’s experts argued for an 8% running
royalty on sales of Microsoft Outlook, while Microsoft’s expert

Id.
Id.
69 Id. at 606-07.
70 Id. at 607.
71 Id. at 608-09.
72 Id. at 607-08.
73 Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
74 Id. at 1308.
75 Id. at 1335.
76 Id. at 1325.
67
68
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opined that the parties would have agreed to a lump-sum payment
of $6.5 million. 77
While neither side had used the analytical method in arriving
at its proposed reasonable royalty, the court nonetheless identified
the analytical method as one of several approaches “routinely
adopt[ed]” by litigants “for calculating a reasonable royalty.” 78 The
court further implied that the analytical method was a separate and
distinct approach from what it characterized as the “more common
. . . hypothetical negotiation or the ‘willing licensor-willing licensee’
approach.” 79 Thus, there is at least Federal Circuit dictum for the
analytical method to be applied outside of the willing
licensor/willing licensee framework, as a separate test focused on
“calculating damages based on the infringer’s own internal profit
projections for the infringing item at the time infringement began,
and then apportioning the projected profits between the patent
owner and the infringer.” 80 But how does one go about apportioning
the projected profits other than by positing a hypothetical
negotiation between a willing licensor and a willing licensee, and
analyzing the strength of their respective bargaining positions?

C. Increased Incidence of Use of the Analytical Method
The frequency of references to the analytical method within
published cases has increased in recent years, as more and more
patentees appear to be relying on such theories in pursuing
reasonable royalty damages. 81 This phenomenon is, in our view,
Id. at 1323.
Id. at 1324.
79 Id.
80 Id. (quoting John Skenyon et al., Patent Damages Law & Practice § 3:4,
at 3-9 to 3-10 (2008)).
81 See, e.g., Kimberly-Clark Worldwide, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prods.,
LLC, 2011 WL 3240452, at *1 (E.D. Wisc. July 27, 2011) (holding on motion for
reconsideration of order compelling production of company-wide financial
documents that information regarding the net profits alleged infringer received
on its earlier products was “relevant to the analytical method of computing a
reasonable royalty” and determining “what it would have been willing to pay as
a royalty”); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2012 WL 2571332, at *8
(N.D. Cal. June 30, 2012) (noting on motions to exclude expert testimony that
“[c]ourts accept a variety of methods for determining a reasonable royalty,” and
listing the “analytical method” as an example); JS Prods., Inc. v. Kabo Tool Co.,
2012 WL 5288175, at *6, *7 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2012) (identifying on motion to
compel discovery the “analytical method” as one of “two approaches for
calculating a reasonable royalty,” and noting that evidence of the “prices at
which [alleged infringer] sells open-end ‘conventional’ wrenches, and the profits
it derives from the sale of those wrenches, may provide part of the foundation
for determining what, if any, increase in sales value or profit is added to a
wrench product by use of the invention”); Apple, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
2014 WL 794328 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2014) (noting expert’s comparison of
profits from products incorporating the patented technology to profits that
77
78
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likely the result of reactions to the Federal Circuit’s tightening of
legal principles applicable to lost profits damages, like the entire
market value rule, which has caused more and more patentees to
resort to reasonable royalty damages theories. It may also be the
result of an increased incidence of infringement suits brought by
non-practicing entities, for whom reasonable royalty damages are
the only form of damages available.
The analytical approach surfaced in February of 2012 in the
Daubert context in a non-practicing entity case, Caluori v. One
World Technologies, Inc. 82 The case concerned a patented device
that projected light on to an object to be cut by a rotary saw.
Plaintiff’s expert testified in deposition and later submitted a
supplemental damage report in which he purported to employ the
“analytical approach” using cost data provided by the defendant’s
expert. 83 In that report, plaintiff’s expert subtracted the infringer’s
median profit from its prior product using non-infringing laser
guides ($3.65 per unit) from its median profit earned on sales of
infringing laser guides ($7.31), to arrive at an incremental profit
purportedly attributable to the patented invention. 84 Plaintiff’s
expert then applied the “fifteen qualitative factors” from GeorgiaPacific, opining that 12 of those factors were neutral and the other
three would have an upward impact on the royalty rate, to arrive at
a royalty of $3.75 per unit. 85 The court denied the defendant
infringer’s motion to exclude such testimony finding plaintiff’s
expert’s “application of the analytical approach . . . not so unreliable
as to require . . . exclusion at trial,” and concluding that defendant’s
challenges to the validity of the expert’s assumptions underlying his
calculations were “better suited to cross-examination rather than a
motion to disqualify.” 86
would have been obtained using the next-best alternative); Viasat, Inc. v. Space
Sys./Loral, Inc., 2014 WL 3896073, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) (granting new
trial on damages over patentee’s argument that “the analytical method provides
an independent basis for the jury’s verdict” awarding more than six times
infringer’s anticipated profits); Ultratec, Inc. v. Sorenson Commc’ns, Inc., 2014
WL 5080411, at *4 (W.D. Wisc. Oct. 9, 2014) (identifying deficiencies in
defendant’s damages expert Keith Ugone’s profit margins analysis purportedly
performed under the analytical approach).
82 Caluori v. One World Techs., Inc., No. CV 07-2035-CAS, 2012 WL 2004173
(C.D. Cal. June 4, 2012), aff’d, 555 Fed. App’x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 213 (2014).
83 Caluori, 2012 WL 2004173, at *8.
84 Id.
85 Civil Minutes for Def.’s Motion to Exclude Stephen P. Heath at 3-5,
Caluori v. One World Techs., Inc., 2012 WL 2004173 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2012)
(available on Pacer). The expert also referenced an earlier license agreement
reached by the patent owner in settlement of prior litigation with an effective
royalty range of $6.09 to $3.50 per unit, which the expert opined “constitutes a
reliable benchmark for determining a reasonable royalty rate under a
hypothetical license agreement . . . in this case.” Id. at 3.
86 Caluori, 2012 WL 2004173, at *8.
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Thus, the Central District of California permitted expert
damages testimony premised in part on the analytical method, but
again, like many of the earlier cases, the expert used that analysis
in support of, not separate from, opinions expressed within the
willing licensor/willing licensee framework.
In December 2012, in Energy Transportation Group, Inc. v.
William Demant Holdings A/S, 87 the Federal Circuit considered the
request of a defendant for a new trial on damages after a jury found
that it infringed two hearing aid patents and awarded lump sum
damages equating to effective royalty rates in the range of 4-5%. 88
Noting the heavy burden that a party challenging a jury’s verdict
on damages bears to “show that the award is, in view of all of the
evidence, either so outrageously high or so outrageously low as to
be unsupportable as an estimation of a reasonable royalty,” 89 the
court, somewhat surprisingly, denied a new trial on damages even
though the plaintiff’s expert, Terry Musika, had employed the 25%
rule of thumb the court had held to be unreliable less than two years
earlier. 90 The court held that “Mr. Musika’s references to the 25%
‘rule’ (which is no longer a ‘rule’) did not irretrievably damage the
reasonableness of his method” because he “relied more prominently
on other factors,” including factors identified in Georgia-Pacific,
which the court hastened to add it “does not endorse . . . as setting
forth a test for royalty calculations, but only as a list of admissible
factors informing a reliable economic analysis.” 91
The court also recognized that Mr. Musika had “performed an
entirely separate analysis of a reasonable royalty using the
method set forth in TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp.,” 92 which the court
described as follows:
This analysis compared the average expected profit margin on the
infringing products, as set forth in Defendants’ expert reports, to the
industry average expected profit margin. Mr. Musika testified this
analysis showed the infringing products garnered a 6.4% increase in
expected profit margin based on the technology in the ETG Patents.
87 Energy Transp. Grp. Inc. v. William Demant Holdings A/S, 697 F.3d 1342
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
88 Id. at 1357.
89 Id. at 1356 (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (en banc)).
90 Id. (citing Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2011)).
91 Id. at 1356-57. The Federal Circuit’s distancing of itself from GeorgiaPacific as a “test,” and its endorsement of “economic analysis” is, in our view,
indicative of the court’s effort to overhaul patent damages, including reasonable
royalty damages, to more closely align with recognized economic principles.
That effort appears to have been a particular crusade of Judge Rader, the author
of the Energy Transportation Group opinion and a panel member in the Uniloc
case. Whether that effort continues at the same pace after Judge Rader’s
retirement from the court, remains to be seen.
92 Id. at 1357 (emphasis added).
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Mr. Musika’s suggested reasonable royalty rates were thus tied to the
benefit accorded by the patents at issue. Thus, this case is not like
Uniloc, where the plaintiff’s expert did not offer acceptable
alternative methods to support his damages calculation. Cf. Uniloc,
632 F.3d at 1318. ETG’s expert provided an entirely separate
damages analysis that supported the jury’s verdict. 93

The court, noting that the jury “did not adopt either expert’s
damages analysis wholesale,” nonetheless concluded “that the
record supports the jury’s award with substantial evidence based on
Mr. Musika’s [sic] TWR analysis and discussion of the premium on
operating profits enjoyed by the accused products.” 94
As we detail below, the Federal Circuit’s characterization of the
“analytical method,” or what it terms “the method set forth in
TWM,” as “an entirely separate analysis of a reasonable royalty” 95
is, in our view, unfortunate. 96 The approach is more properly viewed
as a support to, not a substitute for, the willing licensor/willing
licensee construct—one that, like the operating profit premium
calculated by Mr. Musika and also endorsed by the court in Energy
Transportation Group, helps inform “the top end of a range of
possible royalties the parties would have considered in a
hypothetical negotiation.” 97
In NetAirus Technologies, LLC v. Apple, Inc., 98 Judge John A.
Kronstadt of the Central District of California excluded portions of
opinions offered by plaintiff’s damages expert Joseph Gemini
claimed to have been arrived at under the “analytical approach”
endorsed by the Federal Circuit in TWM. Gemini opined that, “at
the time of the hypothetical negotiation, the parties would consider
the effect of removing the patented feature on the gross profit of the
accused device.” 99 He then purported to calculate the reduced gross
profit that would result from removing the patented feature by
deducting the incremental cost of that feature from its assumed
contribution to the overall price of the device, and used that
difference as the reasonable royalty amount, reasoning that “Apple
would be willing to pay a royalty that would maintain the gross
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
95 Id.
96 Even more recently, in a slip opinion issued on September 21, 2015, a
Federal Circuit panel identified “‘the analytical method,’ focusing on the
infringer’s projections of profit for the infringing product” as “one reliable
method for estimating a reasonable royalty.” Summit 6, LLC v. Samsung Elecs.
Co., Ltd., Appeal Nos. 2013-1648, 2013-1651 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 21, 2015) (found at
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=4448565805055669812&q=Summi
t+6+LLC+v.+Samsung&hl=en&as_sdt=6,45).
97 Energy Transportation Group, 697 F.3d at 1356.
98 Civil Minutes for Order re Apple’s Daubert Motion to Exclude Opinions of
Joseph Gemini, NetAirus Techs., LLC v. Apple, Inc., No. LA CV10-03257 JAK
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 23, 2013) (available on Pacer).
99 Id. at 4.
93
94
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profit it would have received without the feature.” 100 The court
excluded the proffered opinion, not because of any doctrinal problem
with the analytical method, but rather because Gemini’s
calculations were based on assumptions unsupported by record
evidence. 101
In March of 2014, in Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Industries, Inc., 102
Judge St. Eve of the Northern District of Illinois excluded the
patentee’s expert’s damages opinions under Daubert. The case
involved a patent on a dual mode toilet flush valve that permitted
the user to select between two different water quantities depending
upon the type and amount of waste being flushed. The court
identified three “ways . . . to calculate a reasonable royalty”: (1) “the
analytical method, which focuses on the infringer’s projections of
profit for the infringing product”; (2) “bas[ing] the calculation on an
established royalty, if there is one”; and (3) “[i]f there is not an
established royalty, a reasonable royalty may be calculated based
on the supposed result of hypothetical negotiations between the
plaintiff and defendant.” 103
Sloan’s damages expert, Richard Bero, a CPA who had testified
as an expert more than 100 times, calculated reasonable royalty
damages at $106 per unit for a total amount of $7.8 million. Mr.
Bero arrived at this amount through several means more commonly
employed in lost profits analysis, like the entire market value rule,
price erosion, and convoyed sales. 104
Purporting to base his analysis on a hypothetical negotiation
between Sloan and Zurn at the time the infringement began, Mr.
Bero first attempted to identify the range in which the parties would
be negotiating. Mr. Bero reasoned that Sloan would not be willing
to license its patents for less than the profit Sloan would anticipate
making had it made the sales itself:
[C]alculate[d] [] at the time of the hypothetical negotiation, $141 per
Accused Product unit was Sloan’s floor—that is, the lowest price it
was willing to accept—for its expected royalty rate per unit. . . .
Conversely, Mr. Bero found that Zurn’s ceiling—the most it would be
willing to pay—for a royalty payment entering the hypothetical
negotiation was $60 per Accused Product unit. Mr. Bero opined that
in entering into such a license, ‘Zurn would be unwilling to pay a
royalty amount more than the profits it would expect to make if no
license was entered into.’ Mr. Bero identified the difference in Sloan’s
floor of $141 and Zurn’s ceiling of $60 as the ‘negotiation gap.’ 105

Id.
Id.
102 Sloan Valve Co. v. Zurn Indus., Inc., 33 F. Supp. 3d 984 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
103 Id. at 990.
104 Id. at 991-92.
105 Id. at 992-93.
100
101
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Bero’s hypothetical negotiation analysis is obviously hopelessly
flawed. No negotiation, hypothetical or otherwise, can take place if
there is no overlap in the parties’ negotiation ranges. How Bero
could arrive at a negotiated rate of $106 per unit when Zurn would
pay no more than $60 per unit and Sloan would take no less than
$141 per unit defies comprehension. Granted, the “willing buyerwilling seller” construct is a legal fiction, a “device in aid of
justice,” 106 but it cannot be supported by a logically impossible
result—improbable, maybe, but not impossible—and still retain any
rhetorical value.
Surprisingly, the court mentioned this logical impossibility
only in passing 107 in granting the motion to exclude Mr. Bero’s
testimony. Instead, the court focused on Bero’s faulty application of
the entire market value rule, his unsupported inclusion of price
erosion effects and anticipated profits on convoyed sales, and
misapplication of several Georgia Pacific factors—attempting to
apply them quantitatively rather than qualitatively—in his
reasonable royalty analysis. 108 The sum total of these errors, the
court found, rendered “Mr. Bero’s methodology . . . unreliable and it
bears no resemblance to a reasonable royalty analysis.” 109
Ironically, Sloan Valve appears to be a case where the
plaintiff’s expert could have appropriately applied the analytical
method. The very data that Mr. Bero relied on to arrive at the
infringer’s ceiling royalty rate, which he effectively described as the
incremental profit attributable to the patented invention, 110 could
have supported a defensible starting point for valuing “the use made
of the invention by the infringer” 111 through the willing
licensor/willing licensee construct. But, it also likely would not
support the extent of damages plaintiff was seeking.
In August of 2014, in Linear Group Services, LLC v. Attica
Automation, Inc., 112 Judge Gershwin A. Drain of the Eastern
District of Michigan denied an alleged infringer’s motion to preclude
testimony from the patentee’s president, William Bennett, that 20%
of the alleged infringer’s sales would be a reasonable royalty under
Supra, note 33, discussion.
Sloan Valve, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 1000 (noting the arbitrariness of Bero’s
selection of $100 per unit, the midpoint of his “negotiation gap,” as the starting
point for the hypothetical negotiation, “considering that Mr. Bero also
determined that $60 was the maximum price Zurn would be willing to pay for
such a license”).
108 Id. at 995-1001.
109 Id. at 1002.
110 Id. at 992-93 (“Zurn would be unwilling to pay a royalty amount more
than the profits it would expect to make if no license was entered into.”) (quoting
Bero Report at 50).
111 35 U.S.C. § 284.
112 Linear Grp. Servs., LLC v. Attica Automation, Inc., 2014 WL 4206871
(E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2014).
106
107
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the analytical method. 113 The court described the “analytical
method” as “focus[ing] on the infringer’s projections of profits [on]
the infringing product, regardless of what the parties might have
hypothetically agreed to had they successfully negotiated before the
infringement began.” 114 The court permitted the testimony despite
the fact that Mr. Bennett was neither an accountant nor a damages
expert, had no licensing expertise or experience, and had no
knowledge of the alleged infringer’s net profits from sales of the
accused machines 115:
Bennett will be permitted to testify as to his personal knowledge that
calculates reasonable royalty damages as 20% (i.e. his personal
knowledge as to what he believes [his company’s] profit levels to be
and what he believes [the alleged infringer’s] profit to be . . .).
[Defendant] will have the opportunity to cross examine Bennett and
question the weight of his argument. 116

The court further precluded the alleged infringer from
presenting evidence it argued was relevant to various GeorgiaPacific factors because the patentee’s reasonable royalty damages
claim was based on the analytical method, not the Georgia-Pacific
factors. 117 In our view, Linear Products is a good example of the
mischief that can result from an overly literal view of the analytical
method as a separate method for determining reasonable royalty
damages.
In summary, three tests have been identified in the case law
for determining a reasonable royalty to fairly compensate a patent
owner for the infringer’s use of the patented invention: (1) an
established royalty rate; (2) the analytical method, where a normal
profit margin is deducted from the profit margin obtained by the
infringer from the infringing sales; and (3) a hypothetical
negotiation between a willing licensor and a willing licensee. But
are these really three separate tests? We think not. Properly
viewed, the first two tests are simply parts of the willing
licensor/willing licensee paradigm. When record evidence shows an
established royalty rate for the patent in suit, it is logical for the
trier of fact to conclude that any hypothetical negotiation between
a willing licensor and a willing licensee would have arrived at that
established rate. As for the analytical method, the incremental
profit margin attributable to use of the patented invention is clearly
a factor that rational licensors and licensees would consider in
negotiating a royalty rate. In our view, neither of these so-called
alternative tests are truly alternatives to the willing licensor/willing

Id. at *11.
Id. at *5, *9 (citing TWM Mfg., 789 F.2d at 899).
115 Id. at *9.
116 Id. at *10.
117 Id. at *5 & *7.
113
114

2015]

The Economics of Reasonable Royalty Damages

21

licensee framework. Rather, they are relevant evidence to be
applied within that framework.
Further, some commentators and courts have criticized
reasonable royalty damages as not imposing a sufficient burden on
infringers to discourage patent infringement. 118 After all, such
detractors would reason, why would a rational competitor avoid
infringing on a patent if the worst outcome they could suffer is a
royalty equivalent to what they would have paid had they done the
socially responsible thing and negotiated a license prior to
commencing the infringement? 119 But such reasoning ignores the
fact that a reasonable royalty is not the only form of redress. Lost
profits are available on proper proof. Up to treble damages can be
awarded upon proof of willful and deliberate infringement, and
attorneys’ fees are awardable in exceptional cases. Injunctive relief
is available in appropriate cases. Accordingly, reasonable royalty
awards should not be viewed as a means to a compulsory license,
but rather as a means of fashioning fair compensation for preinjunction sales in circumstances when lost profits damages are not
available or provable. Further, it is wrong to assume that all
ultimately held liable for patent infringement set out with a plan to
infringe on known patent rights. And there are positive societal and
macroeconomic benefits from encouraging competitors to designaround existing patents.
With this background, we now turn to a discussion of the
pitfalls that can result from an overbroad application of the
analytical method untethered from the analytical construct of a
hypothetical negotiation between a willing licensor and a willing
licensee.

118 See e.g. Fromson v. Western Litho Plate & Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568,
1574 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (recognizing little disincentive to disregarding patent
rights if, once “the case [is] lost, a license can be compelled, probably at the same
royalty that would have been paid if the patentee’s rights had been respected at
the outset”), overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v.
Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1158 (“setting
of a reasonable royalty after infringement cannot be treated . . . as the
equivalent of ordinary royalty negotiations among truly ‘willing’ patent owners
and licensees” without “mak[ing] an election to infringe a handy means for
competitors to impose a ‘compulsory license’ policy upon every patent owner”;
“the infringer would have nothing to lose, and everything to gain if he could
count on paying only the normal, routine royalty non-infringers might have
paid”).
119 See Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory K. Leonard & J. Gregory Sidak, Patent
Damages and Real Options: How Judicial Characterization of Noninfringing
Alternatives Reduces Incentives to Innovate, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 825, 830
(2007) (categorizing the incentive to infringe on the patent until sued as the
“free option”).
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III. ECONOMIC DEFICIENCIES OF THE “ANALYTICAL
METHOD”
As developed above, the basic idea behind the analytical
method is that one can estimate value attributable to a patented
invention by deducting a company or industry average profit
margin from the profit margin obtained using the patented
invention. Using language familiar to antitrust law, the patent
(presuming it covers useful subject matter) confers some market
power and this market power results in higher profit margins.
Identifying and quantifying those greater than competitive returns
attributable to the patented technology, provides a basis for
determining the value attributable to the infringer’s use of the
patented invention and, therefore, for calculating damages. To
isolate those excess returns, the analytical method directs that the
expert identify the profit margin of the infringing product and then
subtract the “normal” profit margin. The difference is assumed to
be attributable to the infringement.
But how does one ensure that the excess returns are truly
attributable to the patented technology? And what is the
appropriate “normal profit margin” that should be deducted? In the
discussion that follows, we describe the problems that render the
analytical method (as traditionally applied) unreliable as an
independent means to calculate patent damages. To do so we
assume that the analytical method is being applied in a situation
where infringement has been found and the entire infringing
product is based on one patent so that no patent stacking or entire
market rule issues arise. Even in this simple situation, we
demonstrate how the analytical method fails to reliably value “the
use made of the invention by the infringer.” 120 We identify two
fundamental complications: selecting an appropriate proxy for
“normal” profits and ensuring that any “excess” profit margin is
truly attributable to the patented invention.

A. Ascertaining an Appropriate Proxy for “Normal”
Profits
A first limitation of the analytical method involves the proxy
for “normal” profits. Other commentators have noted the difficulty
in measuring “normal” or “competitive” profits. 121 In our view,
normal profits cannot be reliably proxied by a market average or

35 U.S.C. § 284.
See e.g. DENNIS CARLTON & JEFFREY PERLOFF , M ODERN I NDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 247 (4th ed., 2005) (“Economic profit equals revenue minus
labor, material, and an appropriate measure of capital cost.”).
120
121
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the profit margin of a comparable firm, as is implicit in common
articulations of the analytical method. 122
Economic theory beginning as far back as Adam Smith in 1776
has posited that competition equalizes rates of return on
investment, not profit margins. But, the analytical method relies on
differences in profit margins, not rates of return on investment, to
attribute value to the patented invention. The profit margin is
defined as profit divided by sales and is a “flow” measure of profits.
Return on investment, in contrast, is the firm’s profit divided by the
total investment required to achieve that profit. In this sense it
compares profit flows to the amount of investment required to
generate those profits.
When empirically studying firm profits over long periods of
time, economists use the rate of profit as an average measure of
rates of return on investment. 123 The profit rate is defined as profits
divided by total assets. Economic theory holds that if the rate of
return on investment or the rate of profit is persistently high in one
area, it will create strong incentives for others to divert investment
from elsewhere and enter the high return industry. The additional
investment expands supply in the market and tends to lower the
rate of return. This process also works in reverse. If the rate of
return on investment in an industry falls, firms will exit that
market over time. This exit will shrink supply, thereby raising
prices and profits. This process continues until rates of return tend
to be equalized across different industries. As a result, barring
significant barriers to entry, economists expect rates of return on
investment to equalize among markets. This is the essence of Adam
Smith’s “invisible hand.”
In contrast, there is no theory that holds that profit margins in
perfectly competitive markets will be equal. Instead, profit margins
should differ between sectors. High capital intensity sectors will
require higher margins to equalize rates of return. To see this, take
the simple example of two profit rates that are equal in two
markets:
122 See MARC E. ACKERMAN ET AL., ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY, A HANDS-ON GUIDE TO LITIGATION 182 (Daniel Slottje ed., 2006)
(“Ideally, the only difference between the infringing or patented product and the
‘normal’ product is the patented technology or features. In other words, the
operating costs (selling, general, and administrative), distribution channels,
and the like are identical.”).
123 We use rate of return on investment and the rate of profit as conceptually
the same, although in some empirical contexts a distinction can be made
between the two. Technically, return on investment is the present value of all
of the future cash flow that results from an investment in a project (adjusted for
risk) divided by the amount of the investment that generates these cash flows.
In essence, the difference between the ROI and the rate of profit can be thought
of as the difference between the marginal rate of profit and the average rate of
profit. The ROI is the rate of return on the last investment, while the rate of
profit is an average over many investments.
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𝑃𝑃1
𝑃𝑃2
=
𝐴𝐴1
𝐴𝐴2

“P” refers to profit and “A” denotes total assets. Now divide
each variable by “S,” which represents sales:
𝑃𝑃1
𝑆𝑆1
𝐴𝐴1
𝑆𝑆1

=

𝑃𝑃2
𝑆𝑆2
𝐴𝐴2
𝑆𝑆2

The term P/S is the profit margin. It becomes obvious from the
above equation that even if nominal profit margins are equal, if the
assets-to-sales ratios are unequal, the “real” profit margins are also
unequal.
Assets-to-sales ratios are typically very different between
markets because different production processes are employed.
Moreover, within a single market, firms will have distinct asset-tosales ratios based on their specific management processes and
investment histories. Thus, any use of an “industry average profit
margin,” “average profit margin on non-infringing products,” or a
“comparable firm average margin” as a proxy for “normal profits”
defies economic logic and will be unreliable. 124
This limitation on the use of profit margin has been recognized
by the courts in the antitrust context. For example, in United States
v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 the Second Circuit rejected the
government’s argument that Kodak’s “excessive profits” were
evidence of monopoly power, holding that “even if we were to accept
the government’s contention that Kodak’s short-run marginal costs
equal one-half of the product’s sales price, we do not think that it
124 Early economists that studied the empirical relationship between profits
and concentration measured profit rates, not profit margins. See generally J.S.
Bain “Relation of Profit Rate to Industrial Concentration, American
Manufacturing, 1936-1940,” 65 Q.J. OF ECON 293 (1951) (using profit rates as
the standard of comparison between firms); GEORGE STIGLER, NATIONAL
BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH, CAPITAL AND RATES OF RETURN IN MANUFACTURING
INDUSTRIES 72-91 (Princeton Univ. Press 1963) (recognizing that profit rates
are among the best tools for comparing firms). The reason this issue arises in
econometric work but not in basic microeconomic classes is because the
standard microeconomic model is a variable cost or flow model. When fixed
capital is considered, the rule that competitive rates of return are zero is
consistent with the rule that all positive net present value projects will be
undertaken. See RICHARD BREALEY & STEWART MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 20 (2d. ed. 1981) (showing that the “prodigal” and the
“miser” both want different interest rates in order to receive the best rate of
return).
125 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95 (2d Cir. 1995).
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necessarily follows that Kodak is earning monopolistic profits.
Certain deviations between marginal cost and price, such as those
resulting from high fixed costs, are not evidence of market power.” 126
In other words, “high fixed costs” that result from high capital
intensity will cause margins to be higher even in competitive
markets.
It follows that the only reliable proxy for “normal” profit
margins must derive from the infringing firm and product at issue
because, only in that situation, can capital intensities properly be
assumed to be equal. This means that coherent application of the
analytical method requires measuring both the profit margin of the
infringing product and the “normal” profit margin from the
financials of the infringer, not from market or industry averages. 127

B. Properly Attributing “Excess” Profits to the Patented
Invention
Setting aside the “proper proxy” problem discussed above,
advocates of the analytical method might argue that the method can
be salvaged by defining excess profits as the abnormal profit rate,
rather than the profit margin. But profit rates cannot confidently
be measured from firm financial records with the requisite
precision. This point has been made most forcefully by Franklin M.
Fisher and John J. McGowan. 128 The reason is that, in any
particular year, accounting revenue is simply the aggregate of the
cash flow over many projects undertaken by the firm, even if a
single product is assumed.
To illustrate the problem, consider a new oil drilling
technology. Assume an alleged infringer’s sole product is oil from
this technology and the entire oil drilling project takes ten years. In
the first few years of exploration, investments are incurred but no
cash flow is received. In these years, the return on investment in
the accounting records is negative. In later years, most of the
investment costs will have been sunk and if oil is found, cash flows
begin to accrue. In these years, gross profits will be exceptionally
Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
This might be accomplished by measuring a single firm’s profit margin
on an infringing product before and after the infringement occurred.
128 See generally Franklin M. Fisher & John J. McGowan, On the Misuse of
Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 82
(1983) (showing that individual firms’ records do not accurately represent the
profit rates used to compare companies). Economists that empirically measure
profit rates consider long run averages. See generally Yale Brozen, The Antitrust
Task Force Deconcentration Recommendation, 13 J.L. & ECON. 279 (1982)
(arguing that when data for a later period are included, earlier findings about
the relationship between concentration and profits no longer hold). For a review
of the empirical issues, see Mark Glick & Hans Ehrbar, Long-Run Equilibrium
in the Empirical Study of Monopoly and Competition, 38 Econ. Inq. 151 (1990).
126
127
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high, but investment will be small. But the firm’s accounting
records represent an aggregate snapshot of investments and
corresponding cash flows for all the active projects in the firm. Thus,
one cannot typically reliably match infringing profits to the
infringing investment to obtain the rate of return on investment by
the infringer.
This problem has also been recognized in the antitrust context.
In Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wisconsin v. Marshfield
Clinic, 129 Judge Posner expressed skepticism about the practice of
using accounting profits to infer monopoly power because
“measured rates of return reflect accounting conventions more than
they do real profits (or losses), as an economist would understand
these terms.” 130 Moreover, even if one could accurately measure
excess profit margin, it is unlikely that it would be a good proxy for
the impact of infringement. Excess profits are the result of market
power, but patent coverage is only one potential source of such
power. In fact, numerous factors can contribute to excess profits,
including, the impact of rivalry in the market, advertising, location,
brand names, other patents, other forms of intellectual property,
and many other factors.
Rather than consider absolute profit levels, the goal of any
damages analysis should be to isolate the impact of infringement by
measuring the difference between the profits made by the infringer
129 Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d
1406 (7th Cir. 1995).
130 Id. at 1412. Numerous other courts considering this issue both before and
after the Blue Cross decision have agreed with Judge Posner’s essential point
about the lack of connection between profit and monopoly power. See, e.g.,
Baker’s Aid, a Div. of M. Raubvogel Co., Inc. v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 730
F. Supp. 1209, 1218 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (“[D]efendants assert that monopoly power
is shown by plaintiff’s ability to sell virtually the same ovens as HFC at a higher
price. . . . The mere fact that Baker’s Aid is able to sell its ovens at a higher price
than HFC is not, however, evidence that Baker’s Aid earns above normal
profits.”); Bailey v. Allgas, Inc., 148 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1245 (N.D. Ala. 2000)
aff’d, 284 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The court is unaware of any reported
federal antitrust case in which a defendant’s purported high rate of return, by
itself, established market power. The Seventh Circuit has expressly rejected the
theory.”); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir. 1997)
overruled by Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding
that high prices with no showing of restricted output failed to establish
monopoly power); Moecker v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 2d 1291, 1304
(M.D. Fla. 2001) (“[Defendant] is correct that a high rate of return standing
alone is not determinative of market power.”); In re Remeron Direct Purchaser
Antitrust Litig., 367 F. Supp. 2d 675, 683 (D.N.J. 2005) (“Plaintiffs’ one-track
focus on the price of [branded drug] compared to the price of generic [drug] says
nothing about the most important factors that would allow a reasonable juror
to conclude that [defendant] had monopoly power.”). In United States v. Empire
Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296, 306 (8th Cir. 1976), the Eighth Circuit seemed to imply
that “extremely high” margins might lead it to conclude that a firm “was
successful in manipulating prices or competition,” but the defendant’s margins,
which averaged 11.1%, were not so extreme.
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with the infringement, over what profit the infringer would have
made had it not infringed and instead selected the next best
substitute for the infringing technology. Such an incremental
profits analysis avoids many of the complications identified above.
Because this approach considers the infringing firm alone, it does
not involve the capital intensity problem. However, as with the
profit rate calculation discussed above, the costs and timing of those
costs must be accurately calculated for the next best alternative
situation.
In addition, this incremental profits approach controls for some
but not all of the causation issues. In the simple case of a single
patent covering a single complete product, the difference between
what the infringer made with the infringement and would have
made with its next best substitute, conforms well to the concept of
“but for” causation. This is because the profits the infringer would
have made with its next best alternative is another way of asking
what the infringer would have made “but for” the infringement.
Moreover, the difference between actual profits and profits from the
next best alternative comports with the concept of economic profits
because the next best alternative measures the “opportunity cost.”
This is important because it is this measure of incremental profits
that, applying proper economic principles, drives decision making
over licensing the technology, and therefore would be considered in
any negotiation between a willing licensor and a willing licensee.
As an example, consider a situation where an infringer
anticipates earning 8% on sales of the infringing product. The next
best alternative would allow profits of only 6%. Thus, the potential
benefit due to infringement is 2%. It follows that an infringer would
not pay more than 2% for use of the patented technology. Many
economists and economically informed damage experts adopt this
approach to measuring the benefit from infringement even outside
of the analytical method context. For example, Jarosz and Chapman
contend
[a]n incremental benefits analysis examines the gains enjoyed by the
infringer attributable to use of the patent. Specifically, it calls for an
evaluation of the benefits of practicing the patent versus the benefits
of practicing the noninfringing, next best alternative. The legal and
economic communities have long acknowledged the value of such an
examination. 131
131 John C. Jarosz & Michael J. Chapman, The Hypothetical Negotiation and
Reasonable Royalty Damages: The Tail Wagging the Dog, 16 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 769, 813 (2013). See also Elizabeth M. Bailey, Alan Cox & Gregory K.
Leonard, Three Cases Reshaping Patent Licensing Practice, 197 MANAGING
INTELL. PROP. 121 (2010) (“The reasonable royalty analysis should seek to
determine the economic value generated by the patented feature relative to the
next best (non-infringing) alternative.”); Elizabeth M. Bailey, Gregory K.
Leonard & Mario A. Lopez, Making Sense of “Apportionment” in Patent
Damages, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 255, 259 (2011) (“Under a sound
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It should be recognized, however, that measuring incremental
profits does not automatically solve all causation issues. The profits
with infringement could be the result of several patents (patent
stacking) or a combination of the patented technology with other
know how that cannot be used in the next-best, non-infringing
alternative. In these situations, further apportionment will be
required. 132 Analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper.
However, what we wish to stress here is that, even in the simple
case, correcting the deficiencies in the analytical method results in
a calculation of incremental profits attributable to the
infringement.
As we show below, incremental profits are the focal point of
current Federal Circuit law in the lost profits area, and the Federal
Circuit is properly moving in that same direction in the reasonable
royalty area as well. The analytical method aids in this thought
progression, however, only if it is properly limited to incremental
profits over the next-best alternative, not some non-descript
“industry average” or “normal” profit margin; and only if it is
applied within, not as a substitute for, the willing licensor/willing
licensee framework.

IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES IN THE LOST PROFITS ARENA AS A PATTERN
FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN REASONABLE ROYALTY
ANALYSIS
In 1978, four years before the creation of the Federal Circuit,
the Sixth Circuit summarized the standard for lost profit damages
up to that time in Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc. 133
The case is still routinely cited and applied today, perhaps because
it was authored by Judge Howard Markey, at that time Chief Judge
economic approach, the reasonable royalty award (in dollars) should reflect the
incremental value (in dollars) of the patented technology to the defendant as
compared to the next best alternative.”); Paul E. Schaafsma, An Economic
Overview of Patents, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc’y 241, 250 (1997) (finding
that “patent profit must be the foundation of any valuation of patent rights”);
Gregory K. Leonard & Lauren J. Stiroh, A Practical Guide to Damages,
ECONOMIC APPROACHES TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: POLICY, LITIGATION AND
MANAGEMENT 27, 53 (Gregory K. Leonard & Lauren J. Stiroh eds., 2005)
(noting that the “minimum [royalty] could be quite low—at or near zero—if the
two parties operate in different markets or locales”).
132 See generally Eric E. Bensen & Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment
to Rein in the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2008)
(arguing that “apportionment should be the threshold question in every
reasonable royalty analysis”); Brian J. Love, Patentee Overcompensation and
the Entire Market Value Rule, 60 STAN. L. REV. 263, 268-69 (2007) (arguing that
without apportionment, patents are overvalued by attributing more credit to
the infringed upon component than it is due).
133 Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156-57.
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of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and who would later
become the first Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit. In that case,
Panduit sued Stahlin for infringement of a patent covering a duct
for wiring of electrical control systems. Stahlin was enjoined and
later found in contempt of the injunction. Stahlin was selling an
infringing duct at a 30% discount. Judge Markey, writing for the
Sixth Circuit, set forth the classic four factor test as follows:
To obtain as damages the profits on sales he would have made absent
the infringement, i.e., the sales made by the infringer, a patent owner
must prove: (1) demand for the patented product, (2) absence of
acceptable non-infringing substitutes, (3) his manufacturing and
marketing capability to exploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the
profit he would have made. 134

The court found evidence to support factors (1), (2), and (3), but
that Panduit had failed to come forward with sufficient data on fixed
and variable costs to satisfy prong (4). 135 While not discussed in
detail by the court, prong (2) arguably became the most important
aspect of the Panduit test as it forced all future damage experts to
provide some analysis of non-infringing substitutes. Panduit prong
(2) set up a binary test for the award of lost profits. If non-infringing
substitutes exist, the plaintiff is limited to a reasonable royalty. If
the market contains only two competitive substitutes—the patented
and the infringing product—then the plaintiff may proceed to the
other necessary proof elements to obtain lost profits damages.
The Federal Circuit modified this strict limitation to recovery
of lost profits in State Industries, Inc. v. Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. 136
The case involved infringement of a patent covering a method of
insulating water heater tanks using polyurethane foam. The court
found that Mor-Flo had literally infringed State’s patent as well as
infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. 137 The district court
awarded State lost profits based on its market share of 40% of total
sales. The Federal Circuit began its review of the district court’s
decision by taking a step back from the Panduit four factor test. The
Federal Circuit then undertook its own analysis, not with Panduit,
but using a basic “but for” test:
To get lost profits as actual damages the patent owner must
demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that, but for the
infringement, it would have made the infringer’s sales. 138

The Federal Circuit’s retrenchment is appropriate. Panduit’s
four-factor test is one way to prove “but for” causation, but it is not
the only way. The court noted the difficulty of satisfying the second
Id. at 1156.
Id.
136 State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
137 Id. at 1577.
138 Id.
134
135
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prong by showing “the patent owner and infringer are the only
suppliers in the market.” 139 While a two supplier market may be the
only circumstance where the patentee could accurately be assumed
to have made all of the infringer’s sales (presuming manufacturing
and marketing capacity to have made those sales), it manifestly is
not the case that the patentee would not have made any of the
infringer’s sales simply because there were other participants in the
market. The court, therefore, endorsed using market shares to
divide the sales of an infringer when the market contains multiple
competitors. 140
Mor-Flo thus took lost profits law a step closer to the
economically-correct approach of reconstructing the “but for” world
and determining what sales (and at what margins) the patent owner
would have made had the infringement not occurred. But, it is not
sufficient to simply remove the infringer from the “but for” world
altogether. The infringer cannot properly be assumed to have sat
idly by; it presumably would have done something if precluded from
supplying the infringing product, and attempting to re-enter the
competitive fray with its next-best, non-infringing alternative is the
economically proper assumption to make. Blindly applying the
market share approach of Mor-Flo, effectively assumes that the
infringer would have made no sales had it adopted the next best
substitute, an economically implausible assumption applicable only
if the competitor’s cross elasticities with the infringer are
proportional to the existing market shares.
The Federal Circuit advanced the Mor-Flo analysis further in
1993 in BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. 141 In that
case, the patent owner sold a high-end, high-priced windsurfing
board, while the infringer sold a low-priced, albeit still infringing,
substitute board. The court recognized that, while both products
compete, they are heterogeneous and market shares may not
accurately reflect the lost sales to the patent owner absent
infringement. 142 That is, the court recognized that it could not
properly be assumed that the infringer’s customers would have
purchased the patentee’s higher-priced boards had the lower-priced
infringing boards not been available. The price difference made it
much more likely that a substantial number of infringer’s customers
would have foregone purchasing a surf board altogether, or would
have purchased something other than the patentee’s board,
including whatever next-best, non-infringing alternative (if any) the
infringer may have offered. The court, therefore, recognized the
importance of knowing actual cross elasticity when such
Id. at 1578.
Id.
141 BIC Leisure Prods., Inc. v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 1 F.3d 1214 (Fed. Cir.
1993).
142 Id. at 1216.
139
140
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information is available. 143
Two years later, in Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 144 the Federal
Circuit, sitting en banc, strongly reaffirmed that the starting point
of a proper lost profits analysis is the “but for” test, when it held
that lost profits damages are available for all sales the patentee
would have made but for the infringement, including sales of models
not covered by the patent in suit, but still only available from RiteHite. 145 As the court stated:
Panduit is not the sine qua non for proving “but for” causation. If
there are other ways to show that the infringement in fact caused the
patentee’s lost profits, there is no reason why another test should not
be acceptable. 146

Another milestone advance in lost profits analysis came in
1999 in Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods., Inc. 147 Grain
Processing held a patent on certain types of maltodextins (used in
food processing). American Maize produced and sold an infringing
product. American Maize later decided to alter its production
process to avoid infringement, which it achieved after only two
weeks of development work. American Maize changed no equipment
or materials; it simply added another ingredient. Record evidence
demonstrated that the resulting differences in the products were
“irrelevant to consumers.” 148
The district court held that Grain Processing could not recover
lost profits, and that only reasonable royalty damages were
available because, in the relevant “but for” world with no
infringement, the infringer would have implemented its changes
earlier and retained all of its sales because consumers were
indifferent to the production changes. “The district court also found
that American Maize’s production cost difference between [the]
infringing and [the] noninfringing [next-best substitute process]
effectively capped the reasonable royalty award.” 149
The Federal Circuit addressed only the district court’s lost
profits analysis. It explained that, to obtain lost profits, the plaintiff
must “reconstruct” the “but for” market in which infringement is
absent, and critically that
[A] fair and accurate reconstruction of the ‘but for’ market also must
take into account, where relevant, alternative actions the infringer
143 Id. at 1218; see also Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. Tritech
Microelectronics, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
144 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
145 Id. at 1546-48.
146 Id. at 1548; see also King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 947
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (buttressing the Rite-Hite decision).
147 Grain Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods. Co., 185 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir.
1999).
148 Id. at 1348.
149 Id. at 1347.
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foreseeably would have undertaken had he not infringed. Without the
infringing product, a rational would-be infringer is likely to offer an
acceptable noninfringing alternative, if available, to compete with the
patent owner. . . . 150

Thus, the Federal Circuit fully embraced the economic concept
of incremental profit in upholding the district court’s reconstruction
of the “but for” world. Lost profits are properly limited to the
difference between the profits actually earned by the patent owner
and the profit he would have made in the “but for” world where the
infringer adopted his next-best substitute:
[O]nly by comparing the patented invention to its next-best available
alternative(s)—regardless of whether the alternative(s) were actually
produced and sold during the infringement—can the court discern the
market value of the patent owner’s exclusive right, and therefore his
expected profit or reward. . . . 151

This analysis has been consistently followed in subsequent
Federal Circuit lost profits opinions. 152
In the next section, we contend that the Federal Circuit is
advancing in the same direction in the reasonable royalty context—
and appropriately so. We then demonstrate why the analytical
method, as traditionally articulated and applied without limiting it
to incremental profits and using it as a substitute for, rather than
an aid to the willing licensor/willing licensee framework, has no
place in the new economic logic that the Federal Circuit has begun
to employ.

V.

ECONOMIC INROADS TO FEDERAL CIRCUIT LAW ON
REASONABLE ROYALTIES: PROPERLY LIMITING THE
ANALYTICAL METHOD

Though starting later, and therefore lagging a bit behind, we
maintain that the Federal Circuit is making similar inroads in the
application of useful economic principles to reasonable royalty
damages analysis as it has with lost profits damages. As with the
progression of lost profits analysis, however, progress has not
proceeded in a straight line, nor has the progression been
particularly rapid.
The basic paradigm for a reasonable royalty is the amount a
willing licensee would pay and a willing patent owner would accept
for use of the patented technology at the time the infringement
Id. at 1350-51.
Id.
152 Microchemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (Fed. Cir.
2003); Smith & Nephew v. Arthrex Inc., 603 F. App’x 981, 989 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
Nonetheless, the Grain Processing approach to lost profits co-exists with the
older approaches and has not supplanted Panduit and Mor-Flo.
150
151
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began. This is often referred to as the result of a hypothetical
negotiation between willing licensor and willing licensee. 153 As a
matter of economic logic, the royalty rate that a patent owner and
an infringer would agree to must fall within the “bargaining range”
of the parties. 154 Further, an economically defensible royalty rate
cannot exceed the incremental profits that an infringer would
obtain from using the patent above the profits he would make with
his next best alternative. 155 No rational willing licensee would agree
to such a license because it would make him worse off than foregoing
the license altogether. Roy Epstein and Paul Malherbe state it this
way: “The maximum willingness to pay for the relevant patent
rights then depends on the profitability of the infringing activity

153 Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326, 335 (6th Cir.
1938); Wang Labs, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 993 F.2d 858, 870 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Maxwell v. J. Baker, Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1108-09 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
154 We do not consider here other assumptions that must be made, such as
that a bargaining range exists, the date of the negotiation, or the informational
assumptions about what each party knows. It is interesting to note, however,
that courts, including the Federal Circuit, have not been consistently faithful to
this logic. Sloan Valve, 33 F. Supp. 3d 984, is one such example. There,
plaintiff’s damages expert defined a mutually exclusive “negotiation gap”—with
the patentee having a royalty floor of $141 per unit and the infringer having a
royalty ceiling of $60 per unit—yet proceeded to calculate a “reasonable royalty”
between those two amounts based on a hypothetical negotiation between the
two mutually exclusive positions. Id. at 992-93. See also Mor-Flo, 883 F.2d at
1580-81 (upholding award of a 3% royalty despite evidence that infringer’s net
profit margin was 2.1% and despite testimony from patentee’s president that it
would have required at least an 8% royalty).
155
See MARK GLICK, LARA A. REYMANN & RICHARD HOFFMAN,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DAMAGES: GUIDELINES AND ANALYSIS 157-58 (John
Wiley & Sons 2003) (providing a hypothetical where infringer will not pay a
greater licensing fee than the difference in profit between infringing the patent
and using the next best alternative); Roger D. Blair & Thomas Cotter,
Rethinking Patent Damages, 10 TEXAS INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 40 n.194 (2001)
(“the maximum payment that a willing licensee would pay is the difference
between the maximum profit he would earn from using the invention and the
maximum profit he would earn without the invention”); Christopher B. Seaman,
Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard for Reasonable Royalty Patent
Damages, 5 BYU L. REV. 1661, 1667 (2010) (“[A] reasonable royalty for patent
infringement should not exceed the accused infringer’s expected costs of
adopting an acceptable noninfringing substitute. This standard is based on the
economic principle of substitutability: a rational actor will not pay more for a
particular good or service when a lower-cost replacement is available. This
standard is also supported by the negotiation theory, which explains that a
rational negotiator would not agree to an outcome that would be worse than the
next-best available alternative if no deal was [sic] reached. As a result, when an
acceptable substitute to the patented technology exists, a rational accused
infringer would pay only the amount that it would cost to obtain (or internally
develop) and implement the substitute technology, as well as any lost profits or
other costs incurred due to the substitute’s adoption. In fact, the Federal Circuit
has already recognized an analogous limitation on damages in the context of
lost profits.”).
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relative to the next-best alternative.” 156 The incremental profit
margin therefore defines the upper boundary of an economically
defensible “reasonable royalty” negotiation range. This, of course, is
what one calculates when applying the analytical method, properly
adjusted to reflect incremental profits instead of merely offsetting
some “normal” profit margin.
Similarly, the lower bound of the bargaining range is the loss
to the patent owner from the infringer’s use of the invention. No
rational willing licensor would accept a license fee that is below the
amount that allows him to break even. The actual reasonable
royalty rate then will be an amount somewhere in this range
depending on the relative bargaining power of the parties. 157
At present, the Federal Circuit has not fully embraced this
unassailable economic logic. 158 If and when it does, the analytical
method will be relegated to its proper role—not as a separate means
for calculating a reasonable royalty, but rather a useful tool in
obtaining information relevant to the willing licensor/willing
licensee analysis.
Several cases suggest that the Federal Circuit is headed in this
direction. As noted in the earlier section, the district court in Grain
Processing, correctly in our view, held that the incremental benefit
of using the infringing invention over the next best substitute
“capped the reasonable royalty award.” This is because the
incremental profit to the infringer is the upper bound of the
bargaining range. The Federal Circuit opinion did not address this
part of the district court’s decision. But in Riles v. Shell Exploration
& Prod. Co., 159 the Federal Circuit cited the district court’s opinion
in Grain Processing favorably:
[I]n the hypothetical negotiation that characterizes the reasonable
royalty calculation, Shell may have had non-infringing alternatives
to installing with temporary pilings. Thus, under the constraints of
156 Ray J. Epstein & Paul Malherbe, Reasonable Royalty Patent
Infringement Damages After Uniloc, 39 AIPLA Q.J. 3, 28 (2011).
157 See William Choi & Roy Weinstein, An Analytical Solution to Reasonable
Royalty Rate Calculations, 41 IDEA 49, 59 (2001-2002) (developing an equation
to represent the hypothetical negotiation); Eric A. Rudich, Lewis M. Koppel &
Michael P. Padden, Post-Uniloc Reasonable Royalty Damages, LANDSLIDE, Jul.Aug. 2014, at 42 (explaining that some patent owners begin litigation having no
idea the market value of their patent).
158 In fact, some of its decisions expressly state that reasonable royalties are
not capped by the infringer’s incremental profits. See e.g., Mor-Flo, 883 F.2d at
1580 (“There is no rule that a royalty be no higher than the infringer’s net profit
margin.”); Douglas Dynamics, LLC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1346
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (“an infringer’s net profit margin is not the ceiling by which a
reasonable royalty is capped”); Monsanto Co. v. Ralph, 382 F.3d 1374, 1384
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“the law does not require that an infringer be permitted to
make a profit”).
159 Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (J.
Rader). Judge Rader was also the author of the Grain Processing opinion.
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the hypothetical negotiation, the market could not award Riles a
royalty for his method divorced of all relation to a potential noninfringing alternative method. The economic relationship between
the patented method and non-infringing alternative methods, of
necessity, would limit the hypothetical negotiation. See Grain
Processing, 185 F.3d at 1347 (the difference in production costs
between the infringing and non-infringing products “effectively
capped the reasonable royalty award”). 160

Accordingly, by 2002, one could reasonably read Grain
Processing and Shell Exploration together to the effect that the
Federal Circuit had fully embraced the economic role of incremental
profits in both the lost profits and the reasonable royalty context.
However, in 2004, another panel of the Federal Circuit
arguably backtracked a bit in Monsanto Co. v. Ralph. 161 The case
involved an infringement suit by Monsanto for use of patented
recombinant gene sequences inserted into plant seeds. The Federal
Circuit considered a challenge to the jury’s reasonable royalty
award. The defendant argued that “no sane farmer would ever
negotiate a royalty in excess of his anticipated profits.” 162 The
Federal Circuit this time rejected the argument. Citing GeorgiaPacific, it held that anticipated profits were just one of many factors
to consider and that “the law does not require that an infringer be
permitted to make a profit.” 163 The court went on to object that the
defendant’s argument would result in a compulsory license, and
noted that Monsanto had equally manifested its unwillingness to
grant licensees permitting a farmer “to save seed for replanting or
transfer at any price.” 164 One should be careful not to read too much
into the Federal Circuit’s Monsanto decision, however. Bad facts
often can lead to bad law, and it is difficult to imagine worse facts
than those at issue in Monsanto, where the infringing farmer was
repeatedly sanctioned for discovery abuses, repeatedly lied under
oath, and offered the jury no alternative damages model
(voluntarily withdrawing his own expert witness on the day he was
scheduled to testify). 165
However, legal pronouncements from cases with bad facts
frequently make their way into subsequent decisions without those
same bad facts. Four years after Monsanto, in Mars, Inc. v. Coin
Acceptors, Inc., 166 the infringer, Coin Acceptors (“Coinco”),
challenged a district court’s award of a 7% royalty (which led to a
total award of $14,376,062) on the grounds that it exceeded “the cost
Id. at 1312.
Monsanto, 382 F.3d 1374.
162 Id. at 1384.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 1378-83.
166 Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
amended by 557 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
160
161
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. . . of implementing acceptable non-infringing alternatives.” 167 In
addition to criticizing Coinco’s purported evidence of an “acceptable
non-infringing alternative to which Coinco could have switched at
the time of the hypothetical negotiation,” the Federal Circuit, citing
Monsanto, rejected Coinco’s legal argument, stating:
[E]ven if Coinco had shown that it had an acceptable noninfringing
alternative at the time of the hypothetical negotiation, Coinco is
wrong as a matter of law to claim that reasonable royalty damages
are capped at the cost of implementing the cheapest available,
acceptable, noninfringing alternative. We have previously considered
and rejected such an argument. . . . To the contrary, an infringer may
be liable for damages, including reasonable royalty damages, that
exceed the amount that the infringer could have paid to avoid
infringement. 168

Monsanto and Mars are difficult to reconcile with the Federal
Circuit’s decisions in Grain Processing and Shell Exploration, other
than with reference to Monsanto’s bad facts and the Mars court’s
expressed skepticism about the infringer’s acceptable noninfringing alternative evidence. 169 All four decisions purport to
apply the willing licensor/willing licensee framework at the time the
infringement began, but reach discordant outcomes. There can be
little debate, however, that the Grain Processing/Shell Exploration
reasoning is more aligned with sound economic principles.
No subsequent Federal Circuit decision appears to have
directly addressed the issue of using the incremental profit
attributable to use of the patented invention over the next-best
substitute as a ceiling on a reasonable royalty award. 170 The court
has consistently reiterated, however, that reasonable royalty
awards must be tied to the value of the patented invention. In
Lucent Technologies, the court vacated and remanded a reasonable
royalty award in excess of $350 million against Microsoft because
“[t]he only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from th[e]
evidence is that the infringing use of Outlook’s date-picker feature
is a minor aspect of a much larger software program and that the
portion of the profit that can be credited to the infringing use of the
date-picker tool is exceedingly small.” 171 Similarly, in ResQNet.com,

Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1373.
169 The different makeup of the Federal Circuit panels is another possible
explanation, but unsatisfying to those searching for predictive guidance from
application of coherent legal principles.
170 The issue was raised, but not reached by the court in LaserDynamics, Inc.
v. Quanta Computer, Inc., 694 F.3d 51 (Fed. Cir. 2012). While mentioning
evidence indicating that the infringer could have switched to another product
and avoided infringement at a cost of $600,000, id. at 65, the court did not
address what, if any, use should be made of that evidence on remand.
171 Lucent Techs., 580 F.3d at 1333.
167
168
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Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 172 the court vacated and remanded a reasonable
royalty award in excess of $500 million holding that “the trial court
must carefully tie proof of damages to the claimed invention’s
footprint in the market place” and that “[a]ny evidence unrelated to
the claimed invention does not support compensation for
infringement but punishes beyond the reach of the statute.” 173 Use
of “rules of thumb,” like the 25% rule and even the Nash Bargaining
Solution, which unlike the 25% rule is applied to incremental rather
than gross profits, have been rejected as insufficiently tied to the
facts of the case. 174 Royalty rates “untethered from the patented
technology,” 175 and damages theories lacking “sound economic and
factual predicates” 176 have been rejected.
Most recently, in Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Systems, Inc., 177 a case
alleging patent infringement by Apple’s “FaceTime” feature, the
Federal Circuit held that the district had erred in not excluding
three separate reasonable royalty theories proffered by VirnetX’s
expert because “[t]he law requires patentees to apportion the
royalty down to a reasonable estimate of the value of the claimed
technology, or else establish that its patented technology drove
demand for the entire product. VirnetX did neither.” 178 “[T]he
district court should have exercised its gatekeeping authority to
ensure that only theories comporting with settled economic
principles of apportionment were allowed to reach the jury.” 179

VI. CONCLUSION
We have argued in this paper that the so-called “analytical
method” as a separate methodology for calculating reasonable
royalty damages has shaky foundations in both pre-Federal Circuit
and Federal Circuit law. Indeed, in our view, there was never a clear
rationale for severing the analytical method from the willing
licensee/willing licensor approach. As a consequence, the analytical
method never achieved a proper grounding in the goals of patent
damages or in economic principles. This has led to a situation where
ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, Inc., 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 869.
174 E.g., Uniloc, 632 F.3d at 1315 (rejecting the 25% rule of thumb and
vacating $388 million verdict against Microsoft); Virnetx, Inc. v. Cisco Systems,
Inc., 767 F.3d 1308, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (rejecting Nash Bargaining Solution
“without sufficiently establishing that the premises of the theorem actually
apply to the facts of the case at hand” in vacating $368 million verdict against
Apple).
175 LaserDynamics, 694 F.3d at 81 (vacating jury award of $8.5 million and
remanded for a third damages trial).
176 Riles, 298 F.3d at 1311 (vacating $8.7 million jury award and remanding
for new trial).
177 Virnetx, 767 F.3d 1308.
178 Id. at 1329.
179 Id. at 1328.
172
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damage experts can offer a range of unsound reasonable royalty
opinions and claim they are rooting their analyses in a sanctioned
Federal Circuit methodology. Unfortunately, this mistaken logic
appears to have made its way into several district court decisions,
some of which have been affirmed by the Federal Circuit.
As demonstrated above, the fundamental problem with the
analytical approach is the mistaken belief that a “normal” profit
margin can be identified which allows the analytical method to
separate an infringer’s profits into two categories: “competitive
returns” and supra-competitive, “economic rents” properly
attributable to the infringement. It is a misapplication of economic
theory to posit a market competitive profit margin, however.
Competition equalizes rates of return on investment not profit
margins. Thus, use of an industry or market or average profit
margin introduces unacceptable error and speculation into the
analysis.
Rather, the most accurate measure of the impact of
infringement is to abandon the assumption of a “normal” margin
and directly measure the incremental profits from the infringement.
This is properly measured as the difference between the profits
made by the infringer with the patented invention less the profits
the infringer would have made had it selected the next best
substitute for the infringing technology. Once this adjustment is
made, however, it becomes obvious that the analytical method does
nothing more than estimate the upper bound of what the infringer
would be willing to pay in the traditional, hypothetical willing
licensor/willing licensee negotiation at the time of infringement.
The Federal Circuit has recognized the validity of incremental
profits analysis in the context of lost profits damages, as is clearly
evident in the Federal Circuit’s Grain Processing decision. The
Federal Circuit’s doctrinal evolution in calculating reasonable
royalty damages, however, is in our view less definitive. We contend
that once the Federal Circuit applies the same economic rigor to
reasonable royalty analysis as has marked its lost profit decisions,
the analytical method will be relegated to its proper role and be
subsumed within the willing licensee/willing licensor approach.

